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JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
REQUIRING UNIONS TO NOTIFY COVERED
EMPLOYEES OF THEIR RIGHT TO BE AN
AGENCY FEE PAYER IN THE POST BECK ERA
David M. Burns'
A union is a labor organization whose primary purpose is to represent
the concerns of employees regarding grievances, wages, hours, and
working conditions when dealing with their employer! Under the
amended National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),2 a union has the
authority to bargain collectively such terms and conditions of employ-
ment on behalf of all employees if a majority of employees select a union
as their exclusive bargaining representative.3
Once it has been recognized as the collective bargaining representative
for a group of employees, the union has a duty of fair representation to
all of the employees. Because it is bound to represent all employees, the
union generally will seek to insert a union security clause into the con-
tract that it negotiates with the employer.5 Union security clauses, which
are permitted under the NLRA, generally provide that an employee who
works for the contracted employer must become a member of the union
J.D. Candidate, May 1999, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law
1. See 1 Collective Bargaining Negot. & Cont. (BNA) 6:124 (Nov. 6, 1997) (defining
a labor organization).
2. 29 U.S.C §§ 151-169 (1994).
3. See id. § 159(a). Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act provides in
pertinent part that
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the
exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of
collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
other conditions of employment ....
Id.
4. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) (holding that a union must serve all
employees in good faith and without hostility or discrimination).
5. See JAMES W. HUNT & PATRICIA K. STRONGIN, THE LAW OF THE
WORKPLACE: RIGHTS OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES 188 (3d ed. 1994).
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and pay dues.6 The rationale behind union security clauses arises fromS 7
the union's duty of fair representation; the idea is that, in the absence of
a security clause, some employees would not join the union or pay dues
but would benefit from the union's representation at the expense of the
dues paying members.8 Such non-paying employees have been dubbed
"free riders."9 Union security clauses are permitted under section 8(a)(3)
of the National Labor Relations Act in order to prevent free riding.l°
The Supreme Court, however, has ruled that employees do not have to
6. See BENJAMIN J. TAYLOR & FRED WITNEY, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 377 (4th
ed. 1983); see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA states in pertinent
part that
[N]othing in this [Act], or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude
an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require
as a condition of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day
following the beginning of such employment or the effective date of such agree-
ment, whichever is the later ....
Id.
7. See Elena Matsis, Procedural Rights of Fair Share Objectors After Hudson and
Beck, 6 LAB. LAW. 251, 251-52 (1990).
8. See id.
9. See id. at 252.
10. See id. However, section 14(b) of the NLRA permits states to forbid union secu-
rity agreements even where both the union and employer are willing to make such an
agreement. See STEPHEN I. SCHLOSSBERG & JUDITH A. SCOTT, ORGANIZING AND THE
LAW 25 (4th ed. 1991). In particular, section 14(b) of the NLRA states
Nothing in this [Act] shall be construed as authorizing the execution or applica-
tion of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or application is
prohibited by State or Territorial law.
29 U.S.C. § 164(b).
Laws that prohibit union security agreements are termed "right-to-work" laws. See
HUNT & STRONGIN, supra note 5, at 49. Currently, there are 21 states with "right-to-
work" laws in force. See id. at 49-50. These states include: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
and Wyoming. See ALA. CODE §§ 25-7-6, 25-7-30 to 25-7-36 (Supp. 1992); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. CONST. art. XXV (West 1984) and §§ 23-1301 to 23-1303 (West 1995); ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 11-3-301 to 11-3-304 (Michie Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. CONST. art. 1,
§ 6 (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-6-20 to 34-6-28 (1998); IDAHO CODE §§ 44-2001 to
44-2012 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 731.1 to 731.5 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN.
CONST. art. 15, § 12 (1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:981 to 23:985 (West 1998); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 71-1-47 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. CONST. art. XV, § 13 (1995); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 613.230 to 613.300 (Michie 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78 to 95-84
(1997); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-01-14, 34-08-04 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-7-10 to 41-
7-90 (Law Co-op. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Michie 1978) and §§
60-8-3 to 60-8-8 (Michie 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 50-1-201 to 50-1-204 (1991); TEX.
LAB. CODE ANN. §§ 101.051 to 101.053 (West 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-34-01 to 34-
34-17 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.1-58 to 40.1-69 (Michie 1994); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§
27-7-108 to 27-7-115 (Michie 1997).
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become full members of the union." Furthermore, in Communications
Workers of America v. Beck,12 the Court held that those employees who
are not full members do not have to pay the entire amount of dues that
full members pay.1 3
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Beck, several issues in-
volving how to implement the decision have emerged 4 One major and
controversial issue involves delineating the duty of unions to provide
employees covered by a union security clause with notice of their right
under Beck to pay less than full dues. 5
This Comment discusses the various efforts and approaches utilized to
force unions to notify covered employees of their right to pay less than
full union dues in the wake of Beck. First, this Comment looks at various
union security clauses and their requirements and then examines the Su-
preme Court's decision in Beck. Next, this Comment considers attempts
by the President, the judiciary, the National Labor Relations Board, and,
finally, Congress to notify union members of their Beck rights. It then
compares and contrasts these attempts and analyzes them in light of
Beck. This Comment then looks at the potential effects that notice of
Beck rights would have on covered employees. Finally, this Comment
reviews the overwhelming political issues underlying the problem of noti-
fying employees of their Beck rights and concludes that the issue is best
suited for review by the Supreme Court.
I. NOTIFICATION OF BECK RIGHTS TO EMPLOYEES COVERED BY A
UNION SECURITY AGREEMENT - RISING, FALLING, AND RISING AGAIN
A. Understanding Communications Workers of America v. Beck
Under a union security clause, an employee is required to become a
11. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (stating that "mem-
bership" may be "conditioned only upon payment of fees and dues").
12. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
13. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 762-63.
14. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, The Worker Right to Know Act Before the Subcomm.
on Employer-Employee Relations of the House Comm. on Econ. and Educ. Opportunities,
104th Cong. 213 (1996) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 3580] (testimony of Marshall J. Bre-
ger, Visiting Professor, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law).
15. See id. at 208. Three other issues regarding the implementation of the Beck deci-
sion include: (1) determining the appropriate process through which an employee must
request a refund; (2) delineating the proportion of dues that are refundable to an em-
ployee who objects to paying full dues and fees; and (3) determining the appropriate
methods of enforcing Beck rights and the accompanying remedies. See id. at 213.
1999l
Catholic University Law Review
member of the union once he is hired by the employer.16 There are,
however, several types of union security agreements. 7 Such agreements
include the closed shop, the union shop, maintenance of membership
clauses, and the agency shop. 8 The closed shop agreement requires an
emplQyer to hire only individuals who are already union members and
requires the employee to maintain union membership during employ-
ment. 9 This type of agreement, however, is illegal and is not covered by
section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA.2 0 A union shop agreement requires em-
ployees to become union members after they have been hired, if they are
not already members, and to maintain their membership during em-
ployment." A maintenance of membership clause requires employees
who voluntarily join the union to remain members for the length of the
contract.22 There is no requirement, however, that an employee join the
union involuntarily.23 Finally, under an agency shop agreement, employ-
ees are not required to become union members, but they also are not
permitted to be "free riders. ''24 Rather, they may become "agency fee
payers" by paying the union an amount of money equal to the initiation
25fees and dues of a full member without participating as a full member.
1. NLRB v. General Motors: Asserting the Right Not to Be a Member
of the Union
The Supreme Court addressed the question of whether an agency shop
16. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (stating that union security clauses are
permitted by the NLRA and require employees to become dues paying members of the
union).
17. See THOMAS R. HAGGARD, COMPULSORY UNIONISM, THE NLRB, AND THE
COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF UNION SECURITY AGREEMENTS 4-5 (1977).
18. See id. at 4 (noting that there has not been uniform terminology in referring to
various union security agreements, but that these are the most common descriptions).
19. See id.
20. See ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 642 (1976) (noting that the closed shop is discriminatory and,
therefore, not protected under section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA); see also Amalgamated Meat
Cutters and Butcher Workmen of N. Am., 81 N.L.R.B. 1052, 1055 (1949) (holding that the
mere signing of a closed shop agreement constitutes an illegal action).
21. See HAGGARD, supra note 17, at 4 (stating that the employee must become a
member within a specified time); see also National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994) (stating that the specified time cannot be shorter than 30 days).
22. See HAGGARD, supra note 17, at 71 (identifying maintenance of membership
clauses as a "less compulsive variation of the union shop" agreement).
23. See id.
24. See id. at 4.
25. See id.
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violated section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA in NLRB v. General Motors Corp.26
The Court held that an employee covered by a union security clause
need not become a member of the union, but must continue to pay the
dues and initiation fees required of union members. The Court defined
this type of arrangement as an agency shop.2 In General Motors, the
employer had refused the union's agency shop agreement offer believing
it to be illegal, but the Court, having noted the validity of such agree-
ments, stated that such agreements are legal. In arriving at this conclu-
sion, the Court evaluated the legislative history surrounding the enact-
ment of section 8(a)(3). 30 According to this legislative history analysis,
section 8(a)(3)'s allowance of union security agreements serves a dual
purpose." The provision was implemented in order to eliminate both the
abuses of compulsory unionism' and the problem of free riders.3
Because other types of union security agreements are not prohibited
by section 8(a)(3), the Court focused on the definition of "membership"
with respect to union security agreements. 3' It held that "membership"
under section 8(a)(3) was limited to payment of initiation fees and
monthly dues, but did not mean actual membership.35 Thus, an agency
fee payer's "'[m]embership' as a condition of employment is whittled
down to its financial core., 36 The agency fee payer is, therefore, not a
formal member.37
26. 373 U.S. 734, 735 (1963).
27. See id. at 742.
28. See id. at 736 (citing Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberig, 159 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. App.
1959)).
29. See id. 744-45.
30. See id. at 740-41.
31. See id. at 740.
32. See id. (commenting that the most serious abuse of compulsory unionism, the
closed shop, was abolished by the Taft-Hartley Act).
33. See id. at 740-41 (citing S. REP. No. 80-105, at 7 (1947), reprinted in 1 NLRB,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT, 1947 at 407,
413 (1985)). A decline in the amount of free riding may have a "profound" effect on some
unions. See Decline in 'Free-Riding' Beneficial, 47 UNION LAB. REP. WKLY. NEWSL.
(BNA) 119 (Apr. 15, 1993) (citing the findings of two University of Pittsburgh researchers
studying three federal employee unions). As an example, it was estimated that a ten per-
cent drop in free riding at one of the federal employee unions "would have generated be-
tween 20 percent and 28 percent more revenue for that union in each year of the 1981-
1990 decade." Id.
34. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 741. Specifically, under section 8(a)(3) of the
NLRA, a union can require that an employee maintain "membership" in the union as part
of employment. See National Labor Relations Act § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994).
35. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 742.
36. Id.
37. See id.
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2. Reducing Nonmembers' Dues and Fees Under Beck
The Court narrowed the requirements of an agency fee payer's "finan-
cial core membership" in Communications Workers of America v. Beck.38
The Beck Court considered the issue in light of the General Motors defi-
nition of "financial core membership" requiring payment equivalent to
the union's initiation fees and monthly dues.39 Beck specifically ad-
dressed whether a union violated its duty of fair representation by
charging agency fee payers, who were nonmembers of the union, the full
amount of dues and fees that it charged formal members.40 Grieving
nonmember employees raised the issue and argued that spending a non-
member's dues money on nonrepresentational activities, such as social,
charitable, and political events, violated section 8(a)(3) and the union's
duty of fair representation.'
In light of the legislative history of section 8(a)(3), the Court con-
cluded that an agency fee payer's "financial core membership" did not
extend beyond those representational activities that were related to la-
bor-management relations.42 Thus, a union could not require an object-
ing nonmember to pay for that part of dues and fees (agency fees) be-
yond those activities related to collective bargaining, contract
negotiation, and grievance adjustment.43
38. 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 738-39 (stating that a union must fairly represent all employees and may
not discriminate against any of them in using its authority to negotiate a collective bar-
gaining contract) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
41. See id. at 740. Specifically, the nonmember agency fee payers claimed "that the
union failed to represent their interests fairly and without hostility by negotiating and en-
forcing an agreement that allows the exaction of funds for purposes that do not serve their
interests and in some cases are contrary to their personal beliefs." Id. at 743.
42. See id. at 762-63 (stating that section 8(a)(3) authorized the collection of fees and
dues "necessary to 'performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the employees
in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues"') (quoting Ellis v. Brotherhood
of Ry., Airline and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees,
466 U.S. 435, 448 (1984)).
43. See id. at 738. The Court also based its decision on section 2, Eleventh of the
Railway Labor Act (RLA). 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1994). The Court held that section
2, Eleventh of the RLA is the statutory equivalent of section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA. See
Beck, 487 U.S. at 762.
Section 2, Eleventh of the RLA states in pertinent part
any carrier or carriers as defined in this [Act] and a labor organization or labor
organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accor-
dance with the requirements of this [Act] shall be permitted-(a) to make
agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty
days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such
agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the
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B. The Battle of the Presidents: Executive Orders and Beck's Notice
Requirement
The first effort to implement the Supreme Court's ruling in Beck was
slow in coming and not realized until President Bush signed Executive
Order 12,800, entitled "Notification of Employee Rights Concerning
Payment of Union Dues or Fees."' 4 This first effort at notifying employ-
ees of their Beck right, to object and receive a reduced dues requirement
commensurate with only representational spending, placed the burden of
notification squarely on the employer.45
The Executive Order sought to promote harmonious workplace rela-
tions, thereby increasing the efficient administration and completion of
41government contracts. In order to enforce the notice requirement, a
federal contractor who failed to comply could lose any current govern-
labor organization representing their craft or class ....
45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh. Compare id. with 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1994) (showing the
similarities between section 2, Eleventh of the RLA and section 8(a)(3) of the NLRA).
The Court in Beck relied on the RLA case of International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740 (1961), for the proposition that unions cannot compel an objecting nonmem-
ber to pay agency fees unrelated to representational activities. See Beck, 487 U.S. at 745.
The Court held Street controlling because section 2, Eleventh of the RLA and section
8(a)(3) of the NLRA are identical in all material respects despite the Court's warning that
the NLRA and RLA are quite often different and should not usually be construed to-
gether. See id.
Although the Beck Court found the RLA and NLRA sections similar, this Comment
will focus on efforts to require unions to give covered employees notice of their Beck
rights to object to, and not pay for, nonrepresentational activities as they are found in the
private sector under the NLRA.
44. Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. B22. Although this Executive Order is one of the first efforts to provide
employees with notice of their Beck rights, the Office of the General Counsel of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, in 1988, issued an advisory memorandum to its Regional
Directors, Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers regarding notice requirements to be
imposed on unions. See General Counsel Memorandum on Objections to Dues Expendi-
tures, Memorandum GC 88-14 (Nov. 15, 1988), reprinted in 225 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-
1 (Nov. 22, 1988); see also infra note 73 (comparing the NLRB notice content require-
ments with the General Counsel's memorandum to show that the NLRB, in effect, merely
enforced the General Counsel's notice content requirements).
45. See Exec. Order No. 12,800, § 2(a)(1), 57 Fed. Reg. at 12,985 (requiring federal
contractors to post an actual notice to its employees). The required notice informs em-
ployees of their right to become or remain nonmembers of a union as well as their right to
object to payments made for nonrepresentational activities for which they do not have to
pay. See id.
46. See id.; see also Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights
Concerning Union Dues, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1992) (stating that
the Executive Order will help "guarantee that no American will have his job or livelihood
threatened for refusing to contribute to political activities against his will").
1999]
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ment contracts it had and become ineligible for future contracts. 47
However, President Bush's efforts at notifying employees of their
rights under Beck lasted less than a year, as the newly sworn President
Clinton rescinded the order in 1993.4 Clinton asserted that the purpose
of rescinding Executive Order 12,800 was to restore a balance in Amer-
ica's workplace.49
C. Easing Their Way In: The Judiciary and the NLRB Recognize a Duty
to Notify Employees of their Beck Rights
Section 7 of the NLRA provides that employees not only have the
right to engage in concerted activities, but also the right to refrain from
engaging in them.0 The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has
stated that a union has a duty of fair representation under NLRA section
8(b)(1)(A)'s5" prohibition on restraint or coercion of an employee's sec-
tion 7 rights. 2 This duty of fair representation requires unions to inform
employees of their right to object to the spending of dues for nonrepre-
sentational activities and the right to become a reduced fee payer.53 In
the absence of this, an employee may unknowingly support an activity
with his dues that he has a statutory right to refrain from supporting un-
der section 7.5. Thus, a union is restraining an employee's rights under
section 7 and is in breach of its duty of fair representation under section
47. See Executive Order No. 12,800, § 2(a), 57 Fed. Reg. at 12,986. The Department
of Labor issued regulations to implement Executive Order 12,800 after it was signed. See
Obligations of Federal Contractors and Subcontractors; Employee Rights Concerning
Payment of Union Dues or Fees, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,588 (1992).
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,836, 58 Fed. Reg. 7045 (1993), reprinted in 1993
U.S.C.C.A.N. B24. The Department of Labor, following Executive Order 12,836, re-
moved its regulations that had implemented Executive Order 12,800. See 58 Fed. Reg.
15,402 (1993).
49. See Statement on Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Federal
Contracting, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 119-20 (Feb. 1, 1993).
50. See National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1994). Section 7 of the
NLRA provides in pertinent part that:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively.., and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining ... and shall also have the right to re-
frain from any or all of such activities ....
Id.
51. See id. § 158(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(1)(A) provides in part that it will be an un-
fair labor practice for a union to "restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section [7]." Id.
52. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,637 (1992) (proposed Sept.
22, 1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 103) (withdrawn Mar. 19, 1996).
53. See id.
54. See id.
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8(b)(1)(A) if the employee is not notified of his Beck rights.55
1. The National Labor Relations Board's First Look at Beck
California Saw & Knife Works" is the first case in which the NLRB
made an affirmative ruling regarding a union's duty to inform employees
covered by a union security clause of their Beck rights under the
NLRA 7 This decision, however, only affected the rights of nonmember
employees under Beck and not the rights of those employees who were
union members.58 The NLRB stated that it will hold a union to a duty of
fair representation in cases addressing Beck issues. 9
The NLRB held that, in determining when a union must inform a
nonmember employee of his Beck rights, a union is obliged to inform
such an employee only when it seeks to enforce a union security clause
by making the nonmember pay dues or fees. 60 Furthermore, the union
does not have a duty of fair representation to give additional notice to a
new nonmember when he resigns his membership. 6' Thus, a union is un-
55. See id. The NLRB proposed a set of rules for notifying employees in order to as-
sure that employees receive notice of their rights under Beck. See id. at 43,635 (1992).
Several alternative forms of notice were suggested and had to be given each year. See id.
at 43,642. These alternatives include direct mailings to the last known addresses of em-
ployees, posting notices in the workplace and in places where the union normally posted
notices, or publishing the information in newsletters that were sent to all employees cov-
ered by the security agreement. See id. The proposed rules also required unions to sepa-
rately notify nonmember financial core employees of their right to object to nonrepresen-
tational expenditures and thereby pay only reduced union dues. See id. The alternative
methods for providing nonmember employees with such notice also involved either direct
mailings, posting, or publication. See id. At the time it proposed the rules, the NLRB rec-
ognized that cases involving issues addressed by the rules were coming before the Board
for review. See id. at 43,641. The proposed rules were eventually withdrawn in favor of a
case-by-case implementation of Beck's notice requirements. See Rules and Procedures for
the Implementation of Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988), 61 Fed.
Reg. 11,167 (1996).
56. 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995).
57. See California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 (1995). The NLRB
notes that the issue of whether a union must provide a nonmember employee notice of his
right to object to payment of full fees is an issue that came out of Beck, yet was not ad-
dressed by the Supreme Court. See id. at 225.
58. See id. at 224 n.7.
59. See id. at 230. The NLRB noted that it will apply the duty of fair representation
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See id. The
Vaca standard holds that a union breaches its duty of fair representation when its actions
are "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. However, the NLRB also stated that
Beck notice issues can be resolved under the duty of fair representation as set forth in sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA. See id. at 233 n.47.
60. See id. at 231 & 232 n.46.
61. See id. at 231.
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der a duty of fair representation to give Beck rights notice to newly hired
nonmember employees only at the time that the union seeks to collect
dues or fees.62 In addition, newly resigned members are to be given such
notice only if they have not received prior notice.63
In meeting their duty of fair representation, a "wide range of reason-
ableness" is given to unions when it comes to the mode by which they
give an employee notice of his Beck rights.64 Specifically, the NLRB held
that notice printed once a year in a union publication that is sent to all
covered employees is sufficient to notify nonmember employees of their
Beck rights and thereby fulfills the union's duty of fair representation.65
This type of publication notice is sufficient even where the cover of the
publication does not indicate that the notice is enclosed.66 However, if
"the notice is not reasonably calculated to apprise the nonmember em-
ployees of [their] Beck rights," then the union may violate its duty of fair
67
representation.
The NLRB held that the content of notice provided to a nonmember
employee must have several elements.66 First, the union must inform the
61
employee that he may remain or become a nonmember of the union.
Second, the union must inform the nonmember of his right both to object
to paying for union activities that are not related to collective bargaining
and to receive a reduction in fees for such unrelated activities. 70 Third,
the union must inform the nonmember of his right to be given enough
information to allow an intelligent decision on whether to object.71
Fourth, the union must inform the nonmember employee of his right to
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 235.
65. See id. at 234.
66. See id. (noting that "[w]e cannot agree with the General Counsel that the IAM
acted arbitrarily, in bad faith, or in a discriminatory manner, and thereby violated its duty
of fair representation, by failing specifically to note its Beck policy on the cover of its pub-
lication").
67. Id. at 234 n.55. Where a union publication is so lengthy that it basically hides the
notice, however, it similarly will not be sufficient. See id. at 234.
68. See id. at 233.
69. See id. The right to become or remain a nonmember comes from the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963). See supra notes
34-37 and accompanying text (explaining that the Supreme Court does not consider an
agency fee payer a formal member of a union). However, the NLRB in California Saw
noted that General Motors rights and Beck rights are inextricably linked such that it is
necessary to inform an employee of his General Motors rights before informing him of his
Beck rights. See California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 235 n.57.
70. See California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 233.
71. See id.
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be made aware of any internal union procedures for filing an objection.
Finally, when an employee does object, "he must be apprised of the per-
centage of the reduction, the basis for the calculation, and the right to
challenge these figures."73 As these are only the minimum necessary
rights of which a nonmember employee must be apprised, the union, in
its discretion, may give fuller information to an employee. 4
2. Extending California Saw
Following its decision in California Saw, the NLRB considered the
case of Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.,7 which dealt with a union's duty to pro-
vide notice to all covered employees, including current union members,
as opposed to only nonmembers.76
In Weyerhaeuser, the NLRB held that notice to nonmembers must be
given only once-at the time the union first seeks to collect dues and fees
72. See id.
73. Id.; see also United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 943
(Oklahoma Fixture Co.), 322 N.L.R.B. 825, 825-26 (1997) (holding that a union breaches
its duty of fair representation where it fails to disclose its expenditure breakdown to an
objecting employee who requests it even if the union claims that 100% of the dues were
spent for representational activities, and even if the union offers to the employee the al-
ternative of contributing the fees to a mutually agreeable charity); Laborers' Int'l Union of
N. Am. Local 265, 322 N.L.R.B. 294, 296 (1996) (holding that where a union waives an
employee's obligations under a security agreement by telling him that he does not have to
pay the required dues or fees, the union will not have violated its duty of fair representa-
tion if it does not provide that objector with Beck related financial information); Interna-
tional Union of Elec., Elec., Salaried, Mach. and Furniture Workers Local 444, 322
N.L.R.B. 1, 1-2 (1996) (holding that a union must provide an objecting employee with a
union funds expenditure breakdown so that the employee can make an intelligent decision
as to whether he should challenge the union's nonrepresentational fee calculations).
Compare supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text, with General Counsel Memorandum
on Objections to Dues Expenditures, Memorandum GC 88-14 (Nov. 15, 1988), reprinted in
225 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Nov. 22, 1988) (comparing the NLRB notice content re-
quirements with the General Counsel's memorandum to show that the NLRB, in effect,
merely enforced the General Counsel's notice content requirements).
74. See California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 233 n.51.
75. United Paperworkers Int'l Union (Weyerhauser Paper Co.), 320 N.L.R.B. 349
(1995), rev'd on other grounds, Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997), vacated,
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Buzenius, 119 S. Ct. 442 (1998).
76. See id. at 349. In Weyerhaeuser, the NLRB applied the rationale of California
Saw. See id. However, in Weyerhaeuser, the NLRB assessed the union's duty of fair rep-
resentation under section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA, rather than under the standard ar-
ticulated in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See id. at 349 n.5; see also supra notes 57-59
and accompanying text (noting that in California Saw, the NLRB chose to apply the duty
of fair representation standard as set forth by the Supreme Court in Vaca, while at the
same time recognizing that Beck notice issues also could be resolved under section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA).
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from the nonmember employee.77 As for current union members, the
same notice given to nonmembers under California Saw also must be
given once to those current members who have not previously received
• 78
the notice. Furthermore, unions must inform covered employees of the
statutory limits on union security obligations, regardless of the language
used in the security clause.79 Finally, the NLRB noted that it does not
prescribe the form of the notice that must be given.8°
Another issue that has arisen regarding Beck notification requirements
is whether notice must be provided in the union security clause itself.81 In
Nielsen v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
82Local Lodge 2569, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit held that a union security clause itself need not contain detailed
notice provisions.8' However, a union may be found to have inade-
quately informed the employees of their right to object and, therefore,
breached its duty of fair representation where its notice defines financial
core expenses too broadly.8'
Finally, in Rochester Manufacturing Co.,81 the NLRB addressed the is-
sue of the proper remedy where a union failed to inform all covered em-
ployees of their Beck rights." The NLRB noted that in remedying viola-
tions of the NLRA, its practice was to restore the status quo ante.87
Therefore, the violating union first must give Beck rights notice to all
77. See Weyerhaeuser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 350.
78. See id. (stating that notice to current members assures that they have not been
misled about dues requirements).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See Nielsen v. International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local
Lodge 2569, 94 F.3d 1107, 1108 (7th Cir. 1996), cert denied, 117 S. Ct. 1426 (1997).
82. Id.
83. See id. at 1115; see also International Union of Electronic, Electrical, Salaried,
Mach. & Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 1534, 1539 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (holding that
there was no substantial evidence that the union was acting in bad faith by not inserting
notice of Beck rights in the union security clause).
84. See Abrams v. Communications Workers of Am., 59 F.3d 1373, 1379-80 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (noting that overbreadth is not cured even if a union lists some nonchargeable ex-
penses).
85. 323 N.L.R.B. No. 36, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1249 (Mar. 12, 1997), available at De-
cisions and Orders of the NLRB (Volume 323) (visited Oct. 19, 1998)
<http://www.nlrb.gov/slip323.html>.
86. See id. slip op. at 4,154 L.R.R.M. at 1252 (noting that the issue was not addressed
in either California Saw or Weyerhaeuser).
87. See id. (stating that to restore the status quo ante, there must be a reconstruction
of "the circumstances that would have existed but for the unlawful conduct").
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covered employees. 8i Second, the union must give each employee the
opportunity to object to each of the past accounting periods about whichthe mploee •89
the employee complains. Lastly, the union must reimburse each ob-
jecting employee for the "nonrepresentational activities that occurred
during the accounting period or periods covered by the complaint in
which the nonmember employee has objected." 9
D. Congress Gets Into the Act: Proposing Legislation to Increase
Notification that Employees Receive Regarding the Right to be Agency
Fee Payers
In the wake of Beck and various NLRB decisions implementing its
holding, Congress has not gone unspoken with regard to notifying em-
ployees of their right to be an agency fee payer under the NLRA.9' In-
deed, the House Committee on Education and the Workforce's stated
purpose under the Worker Paycheck Fairness Act ("the House Bill")
was to make sure that all workers are aware of their Beck rights.9,
The House Bill proposed two forms of notice to make workers aware
of these rights: written consent and posting.93 Section 4 of the House Bill
would have required unions to obtain prior, voluntary, written consent
for any part of dues that are not germane to the representational func-
88. See id. slip op. at 4, 154 L.R.R.M. at 1253.
89. See id. (asserting that the union must process each objection as it would have un-
der California Saw).
90. Id.
91. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. (1997); Paycheck
Protection Act, S. 9, 105th Cong. (1997); Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996, H.R.
3820, 104th Cong. Title IV (Worker Right to Know) (1996). The Worker Right to Know
Act, originally H.R. 3580, 104th Cong. (1996), was included as several provisions in the
Campaign Finance Reform Act of 1996. See H.R. 3820, Title IV; 142 CONG. REC. H8458,
H8462-63 (daily ed. July 25, 1996) (statements of Rep. Clay and Rep. Fawell). These pro-
visions essentially required: (1) unions to obtain prior written consent of employees before
it could collect dues for nonrepresentational activities, and (2) employers to post notice of
employees' Beck rights. See H.R. 3820, §§ 404-405. Thus, H.R. 3820 and H.R. 1625 re-
quired essentially the same form of notice. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text
(noting that H.R. 1625 required written consent and notice posting). The House ultimately
denied passage of H.R. 3820 by a vote of 162 to 259. See 142 CONG. REC. H8516 (daily ed.
July 25, 1996).
92. See H.R. 1625, § 3. The House Committee on Education and the Workforce re-
ported H.R. 1625 to the whole House on November 8, 1997. See 143 CONG. REc. H10418
(daily ed. Nov. 8, 1997). However, no further action was taken before the 105th Congress
adjourned. See Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, H.R. 1625, (visited Jan. 24,
1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-binlbdquery/D? d105: 1:./temp/-bdHobo:LIfbss/dl O5query
.htmll>.
93. See H.R. 1625, §§ 4-5.
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tions of the union.94 The written authorization must state that the em-
ployee does not have to sign and that, by signing, he allows fees paid to
the union to be spent on nonrepresentational activities such as political,
social, and charitable activities.9 The posted notice portion of the House
Bill would have required employers to post notices in employee areas in-
forming them that the union must obtain their prior, written authoriza-
tions for securing fees that may be used for nonrepresentational activi-
ties.96 In addition to the notice requirements, the House Bill contained a
punitive clause for failure to obtain a prior written authorization from
97
each employee. This clause made labor organizations liable for up to
two times the amount of fees they accept without obtaining prior written
consent.99
The Senate's Paycheck Protection Act ("the Senate Bill") also sought
to make workers aware of how their union fees are being spent, particu-
larly in relation to political spending.99 Specifically, the Senate Bill would
have amended section 316 of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971'00 by requiring labor organizations to obtain prior written, voluntary
authorization from each covered employee before collecting or assessing
dues that would be spent on political activities.1"'
Various facets of the government, including two Presidents, the
NLRB, the courts, and Congress have all played a role in efforts to make
workers aware of their Beck rights. However, whether union workers
are acually aware of their rights to be fee objectors may be questionable
in light of a recent survey finding that seventy-eight percent of union
workers were not aware of their right to pay a reduced fee based on rep-
94. See id. § 4(a)(1).
95. See id. § 4(a)(2).
96. See id. § 5.
97. See id. § 4(c).
98. See id. § 4(c)(1).
99. S. 9, 105th Cong. (1997); see also 143 CONG. REC. S264 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Nickles) (commenting that the Paycheck Protection Act "deals with
making sure that no one is compelled to contribute to political campaigns with which they
[sic] disagree"). The Senate Committee on Rules and Administration held hearings on S.
9, however, no other action was taken before the 105th Congress adjourned. See Bill
Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, S. 9, (visited Jan. 24, 1999)
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?dl05:1 :./temp/-bd5OLk:LI/bss/dl05query
.htmll>.
100. See S. 9, § 2. For the text of section 316 of the Federal Campaign Act of 1971, see
2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994).
101. See S. 9, § 2(c)(1)(B); see also 143 CONG. REC. S265 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997)
(statement of Sen. Nickles) (noting that the NLRB has made efforts in enforcing Beck
rights, but stating that "more needs to be done").
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resentational activities only.'O°
II. DELINEATING THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
"Notice" generally involves "[a]ny fact which would put an ordinarily
prudent person on inquiry."1 3 In the legal sense of the word, notice is
"information concerning a fact, actually communicated to a person by an
authorized person, or actually derived by him from a proper source.
''4
The communication is considered "actual" when "the person sought to
be affected by it knows thereby of the existence of the particular fact in
question."' 5
A. The Executive's Application of Notice
President Bush's Executive Order to implement Beck placed the bur-
den of notice squarely on the employer, without placing any duty on the
union itself.1  However, under Beck, the union, not the employer, owes
the duty of fair representation to the covered employeei °7 Following the
holding in Beck, the NLRB placed the duty of fair representation to no-
102. See Americans for a Balanced Budget, Union Members Poll (last modified Apr.
23-28, 1996) (last visited Sept. 4, 1997) <http://www.abb.org/abb/pr/abbpoll.html> (on file
with Catholic University Law Review).
103. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1061 (6th ed. 1990) (citing State ex rel. Gleason v.
Rickhoff, 541 S.W.2d 47, 50 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977).
104. Id. (citing United States v. Tuteur, 215 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1954)).
105. Id. (citing United States v. Tuteur, 215 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1954)).
106. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order 12,800
as placing the notice requirement on federal contractors). Executive Order 12,800 in-
cluded a sample notice containing information that had to be provided in any notice. See
Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992). The sample notice was headed by the
words "NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES" and stated:
Under Federal law, employees cannot be required to join a union or maintain
membership in a union in order to retain their jobs. Under certain conditions,
the law permits a union and an employer to enter into a union-security agree-
ment requiring employees to pay uniform periodic dues and initiation fees.
However, employees who are not unionmembers [sic] can object to the use of
their payments for certain purposes and can only be required to pay their share
of union costs relating to collective bargaining, contract administration, and
grievance adjustment.
If you believe that you have been required to pay dues or fees used in part to
support activities not related to collective bargaining, contract administration, or
greivance [sic] adjustment, you may be entitled to a refund and to an appropriate
reduction in furture [sic] payments.
Id. The notice concluded with the address of the National Labor Relations Board so that
employees could obtain further information regarding their rights. See id.
107. See Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 739 (1988) (cit-
ing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967)).
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tify members of their Beck rights on the union. "' Thus, President Bush's
Executive Order seems to have misplaced the burden of notification.
Furthermore, the Executive Order sought only to notify employees of
their right to object and pay reduced fees under the NLRA; it did not
seek to notify employees of their other rights under the NLRA."1 As
Beck rights are only a few among many of the NLRA rights available to
protect employees, many have criticized a notice requirement that noti-
fies employees of one set of rights while ignoring the rest of the body of
NLRA rights."' As one commentator stated, notifying employees only
of their Beck rights without notifying them of their other rights is like the
tail wagging the dog."2 Thus, whether the true purpose of President
Bush's Executive Order was actually to inform employees of their Beck
rights or was rather some antiunion tactic has been called into question."3
108. See supra note 59 and accompanying text (recognizing the duty of fair representa-
tion as found in Vaca and section 8(b)(1)(A)).
109. See supra notes 45-47, 106-08 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order
12,800 as placing the notice requirement on the employer, while it is actually the union,
and not the employer, who owes the duty of fair representation to the covered employee).
110. See Statement on Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Federal
Contracting, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 120 (Feb. 1, 1993) (stating President
Clinton's view that the Executive Order was distinctly antiunion).
ill. See GAIL MCCALLION ET AL., LABOR CONTROVERSIES: SUSPENSION OF DAVIS
BACON; OPEN-SHOP BIDDING REQUIREMENTS; AND, "BECK" RIGHTS, CRS-14 (Con-
gressional Research Serv. No. 93-458 E, Apr. 15, 1993).
112. See id. (explaining that notifying employees only of their Beck rights and not the
rest of their NLRA rights has been criticized).
113. See Richard L. Berke, Bush Fires a Shot at Union Political Spending, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 19, 1992, at E3 (stating that some union officials believed that President Bush was
attempting to hurt the labor movement); see also infra notes 204-12 and accompanying
text (illustrating further discussion of President Bush's possible purposes for Executive
Order 12,800).
Not only have President Bush's motives in signing the Executive Order been ques-
tioned, but so has his authority to enact the Order. See MCCALLION, supra note 111, at
CRS-18 (noting that Congress has given the NLRB the exclusive role of assessing reme-
dies for unfair labor practices and that the President had little authority to enact Executive
Order 12,800). When evaluating presidential authority and powers, there are three situa-
tions to consider: (1) when the President acts under express or implied authorization of
Congress, (2) when the President acts without a congressional grant or denial, such that he
may have concurrent power with Congress, often dubbed a "zone of twilight," and (3)
"[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress." Id. at CRS-16 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952)). In the third situation, the presidential powers are at their weakest. See id.
President Bush's powers in issuing Executive Order 12,800 appear to fall into the third
category. See id. at CRS-18. Imposing notice-posting requirements is a power reserved to
the NLRB by Congress. See id. As such, his powers are at their weakest point and, there-
fore, he may not have authority to impose notice-posting requirements. See id.
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B. The Aftermath of California Saw
It took the NLRB approximately four years after the 1988 Beck deci-
sion to first address the issues raised in Beck.14 Recognizing the signifi-
cance of the Beck decision, the NLRB sought to enforce the decision by
engaging in substantive rulemaking, something it had done only one
other time in Board history."' However, the NLRB, after abandoning
rulemaking in favor of resolving Beck issues on a case-by-case ap-
proach,'16 has been criticized for moving at an egregiously slow pace in
enforcing Beck rights.117 The slow pace at which the NLRB has moved is
evidenced by the fact that it took nearly eight years to address Beck
rights issues determinatively, including the notice issue, in California Saw
& Knife Works."'
1. A Wide Range of Reasonableness
The NLRB, in California Saw, granted unions a "wide range of rea-
sonableness" in addressing the way in which a union may notify employ-
ees of their Beck rights." 9 Logically, it follows that the NLRB, in grant-
ing this "wide range of reasonableness," does not prescribe the form
which a union's notice to covered employees must take." °
One rationale, which may explain the NLRB's failure to provide a
Beck notice bright line test, may come from its concern for fairness. In
both California Saw and Weyerhaeuser, the NLRB asserted that the no-
114. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635 (1992) (addressing the imple-
mentation of the Beck holding through rule making rather than on a case-by-case basis).
115. See Frank Swoboda, Labor Board to Address Dues Issue, WASH. POST, May 5,
1992, at C1.
116. See supra note 55 (discussing the rules proposed by the NLRB and noting that
they were eventually withdrawn in favor of a case-by-case approach).
117. See Robert Hunter, Compulsory Union Dues in Michigan: The Need to Enforce
Union Members' Rights, and the Impact on Workers, Employers, and Labor Unions at 18
(visited Oct. 21, 1998) <http://www.mackinac.org/studies/s97-01.htm> (describing the
NLRB as moving at a "snail's pace" in enforcing Beck); see also Witnesses Tell Panel Re-
bate of Dues Spent on Politics is Hard to Achieve, 10 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 396, 397 (Apr.
24, 1996) (commenting upon Representative Fawell's statement that the NLRB's case-by-
case approach to Beck is like "molasses going uphill").
118. 320 N.L.R.B. 224 (1995).
119. See id. at 235. However, the Board also stated that the notice must be "reasona-
bly calculated to apprise the nonmember employees of Beck rights." Id. at 234 n.55.
120. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 N.L.R.B.
349, 350 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997),
vacated, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Buzenius, 119 S. Ct. 442 (1998).
121. See California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 233 & n.50 (noting that the NLRB agrees
with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia that considerations
of fairness extend to a union's notice of Beck rights to covered employees).
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tice requirements it had prescribed provided fair protection both to indi-
122
vidual employees and to unions. Particularly, the individual em-
ployee's rights were protected by the NLRB's notice requirements while
the union, comprised of full dues paying members, was ensured that a
free rider problem would not develop.
23
However, fairness may not be the NLRB's only reason in granting un-
ions such wide latitude in determining the form that their notice will
take. In fact, the NLRB may not truly be acting fairly towards individual
employees and may, in fact, be of no help to them in determining their
dues obligations in light of Beck.24 This lack of help may come from dis-S • • 12'
agreement with Supreme Court decisions allowing covered employees
126 121to remain nonmembers and to pay reduced dues. Chairman Gould
has asserted that covered employees should pay full dues and not be al-
lowed to become nonmembers.' This belief may have carried over into
the NLRB's decision not to specify the form of notice that unions must
provide, but rather allow them a "wide range of reasonableness."
2. Union Publications and Annual Notice
The NLRB did, however, sanction the use of notice through a union
122. See id. at 233; see also Weyerhaeuser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 350.
123. See Weyerhauser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 350. Specifically, the Board stated that "[t]hese
notice requirements furnish significant protection to the interests of the individual unit
employee vis-a-vis Beck rights, without compromising the countervailing collective inter-
ests of bargaining unit employees in ensuring that every unit employee contributes to the
cost of collective-bargaining activities." Id.
124. See Campaign Finance Revisions: Hearings Before the Senate Rules Comm., 105th
Cong. 4 (1997) [hereinafter Campaign Finance Revisions] (written statement of Raymond
J. LaJeunesse, Jr., Staff Attorney, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation) (on
file with the Catholic University Law Review), available in 1997 WL 11234481.
125. See id. at 4 (citing NLRB Public Release, March 20, 1997, pp. 5-6). In this press
release, NLRB Chairman Gould asserted that
[General Motors] in its insistence that union membership can be defined as only
requiring the payment of periodic dues and initiation fees is, in my judgment, a
decision that was erroneous. I think that the statute is consistent with an ap-
proach which would allow unions and employers, where the union enjoys major-
ity support, to negotiate an agreement which requires full membership obliga-
tions, as well as the payment of initiation fees and dues.
Id.
126. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 743 (1963) (allowing covered
employees to be or become nonmember employees).
127. See Communications Workers of America v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (allowing
nonmember employees to object to paying full dues and fees and, therefore, only pay for
representational activities).
128. See supra note 125 (quoting comments made by Chairman Gould in an NLRB
press release).
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publication.1 29 In fact, the NLRB has held that such notice is sufficient to
notify covered employees of their Beck rights where it is printed in one
union publication per year and is mailed to the last known address of
each employee.30
Despite the NLRB's ruling that publication notice is sufficient to ap-
prise employees of their Beck rights, such notice may not "actually"
communicate these rights to employees. One criticism of publication no-
tice is that the cover of the magazine or pamphlet does not have to men-
tion that the Beck rights notice is enclosed. 3' Additionally, even if the
notice is not highlighted on the cover of the publication, it has been ar-
gued that the notice should at least be highlighted in the table of con-t . 132
tents. The dilemma of failing to highlight the notice on the cover may
come into play when dealing with covered employees who do not belong
to the union.'33 Without the notice highlighted on the cover to catch the
eye, a nonmember employee is not likely to read the union publication
because he does not belong to the union.34 Furthermore, the publication
notice may simply be sent to the employee's last known address.35 Ac-
cordingly, if an employee no longer resides at that address, the employee
may never get any notice. Thus, publication notice may not "actually"
inform employees of their Beck rights.
Moreover, publication notice has been criticized as a means of hiding
the notice.'36 The NLRB has recognized that where a publication is
lengthy, it may not be reasonably calculated to inform an employee of his
rights.3 7 Yet, the NLRB assumes that, even with a short publication, a
nonmember should make a reasonable perusal of the publication in or-
der to discover possible notice.' This ignores the argument that non-
129. See California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 234-35 (1995) (holding that
the union's publication satisfied its duty of fair representation).
130. See id. at 234.
131. See id. (noting that the General Counsel of the NLRB believed that the publica-
tion notice was unlawful because it did not mention the Beck notice on the cover).
132. See id. at 231-32 n.41 (noting Member Cohen's assertion that "the [Machinists']
Union highlights other information on the cover of [its publication], but has never men-
tioned Beck rights on the cover").
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (citing California Saw for the proposi-
tion that publication notice need only be sent to each employee's last known address).
136. See Campaign Finance Revisions, supra note 124, at 6-7 (written statement of
Raymond J. LaJeunesse) (stating that the notice in the union publication was not high-
lighted on the cover and was printed in reduced typeface).
137. See California Saw, 320 N.L.R.B. at 234 & n.55.
138. See id. at 234.
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members will not even look through the publication of an organization to
which they do not belong in the first place.139
The NLRB, in Weyerhaeuser, also asserted that notice need be given
only once, not annually, regardless of whether notice is by publication or
some other form. 140 However, the initial NLRB reaction to Beck was that
notice was to be given annually. 41 One reason for this may stem from
the fact that unions may require nonmember employees to file new ob-
jections each year in order to receive their reduced dues rate. 42 In fact,
members of the NLRB have argued that annual notice should be given to
employees who must renew their objections each year. 14  Even some
unions, out of fairness to employees, have taken it upon themselves to
provide notice on an annual basis under some circumstances.
3. Posting Notice Through Punishment
Although the NLRB does not prescribe the form that a union's Beck
notice must take, there are times that it will require posting of notice.
139. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing Member Cohen's dissent-
ing argument in California Saw that nonmembers will not read a union publication since
they do not belong to the union and, as a result, they will not actually be notified of their
Beck rights).
140. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union (Weyerhaeuser Paper Co.), 320 N.L.R.B.
349, 350 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, Buzenius v. NLRB, 124 F.3d 788 (6th Cir. 1997),
vacated, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Buzenius, 119 S. Ct. 442 (1998).
141. General Counsel Memorandum on Objections to Dues Expenditures, Memoran-
dum GC 88-14 (Nov. 15, 1988), reprinted in 225 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) D-1 (Nov. 22,
1988); see also supra note 73 (comparing the NLRB notice content requirements with the
General Counsel's memorandum to show that the NLRB, in effect, merely enforced the
General Counsel's notice content requirements). However, the NLRB has not enforced
that annual notice provision of the memorandum. See Weyerhaeuser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 350
(holding that notice needs to be given to nonmembers and members alike only once and is
not a "continuing requirement").
142. See Matsis, supra note 7, at 268.
143. See Weyerhaeuser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 350 n.7 (noting Member Cohen's support of
annual notice where the union requires an employee to renew his objection each year in
order to receive reduced dues and fees); see also Group Health Inc., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 31,
154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1204, 1209 n.6 (Feb. 27, 1997) (noting Member Higgins's support of
annual notice).
144. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 102 (written statement of Mark
Schneider, Associate General Counsel of the International Association of Machinsists and
Aerospace Workers) (stating that because the Machinists Union requires objectors to
submit their objections within "a particular one-month 'window period,' [they] felt that
fairness required that [they] provide notice to all of [their] represented employees on an
annual basis"). This ability of unions to provide fuller notice of Beck rights to its employ-
ees was asserted in California Saw & Knife Works. See 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 n.51 (1995).
145. See MCCALLION ET AL., supra note 111, at CRS-19 (asserting that the NLRB
may require posting of notice as a part of a cease and desist order).
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For example, a union may be required to post notice of Beck rights at the
workplace for sixty days as part of a cease and desist order where it fails
to inform its covered employees of these rights. 14' Thus, the NLRB does
prescribe a form of notice in this respect.
This posting of notices may be more effective than mere publication.
For example, an employee who shows up for work will find notice posted
in the workplace, whereas an employee who only receives notice through
a publication mailed to his last known address may never actually receive
the notice. 1 ' Therefore, to "actually" communicate Beck rights to em-
ployees, it seems more beneficial for the individual employee to have the
union fail to provide notice and thereby be forced to post it in the work-
place by an NLRB order.
4 1
Though the NLRB may actually prescribe notice posting in its orders,
the Board may be justified in its decision not to prescribe the form that
. 149
notice must take. In the past, the Supreme Court has refused to en-
force NLRB decisions on other issues that included orders to post notice,
where Congress had not spoken to the particular issue.5
C. Opting-Out and Opting-In
While the NLRB has decided not to prescribe the form that notice
must take, Members of Congress, speaking out on the issue of notifying
146. See id.; see also Weyerhaeuser, 320 N.L.R.B. at 355 (noting that the union must
also maintain the notices to ensure that they are not vandalized). In Weyerhaeuser, the
Board also required the Union to "make additional signed copies of their notice available
for the employer to post with its own notice to ensure that nonmember employees are suf-
ficiently apprised of their rights." Id.; see also Service Employees Int'l Union Local 74
(Parkside Lodge of Connecticut, Inc.), 323 N.L.R.B. No. 39, slip op. at 3 (Mar. 21, 1997),
available at Decisions and Orders of the NLRB (Volume 323) (visited Oct. 22, 1998)
<http://www.nlrb.gov/slip323.html> (stating that the notice must be maintained for 60 con-
secutive days in conspicuous places); Rochester Mfg. Co., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 36, slip op. at
6 (Mar. 12, 1997), available at Decisions and Orders of the NLRB (Volume 323) (visited
Oct. 22, 1998) <http://www.nlrb.gov/slip323.html> (requiring notice to be posted and
maintained for 60 consecutive days in places where notice to employees and members are
customarily posted).
147. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (stating that a nonmember em-
ployee is not likely to read a union publication since he is not a member of the union).
Even if he would read the publication, the employee may no longer live at the last known
address that the union has and therefore might never get the publication containing the
notice in the first place. See id.
148. See id.
149. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (pointing out the NLRB's decision not
to prescribe the form that a union's notice must take as asserted in Weyerhaeuser).
150. See Union Dues Regulations, 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635, 43,637-38 (proposed Sept. 22,
1992) (withdrawn Mar. 19, 1996) (citing Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667
(1961)).
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employees of their Beck rights, have proposed several forms of notifica-
tion' 1 The first proposed form of notification, prior written authoriza-
tions, requires unions to obtain written authorizations of employees be-
fore they collect any dues for nonrepresentational activities.'52 These
prior written authorizations are, in essence, an "opt-in" procedure
whereby the employee must approve of the union's collection of dues for
nonrepresentational activities such that he does not have to object to
nonrepresentational spending in order to pay reduced dues. 53 On the
other hand, an employee currently is required to opt-out of nonrepresen-
114tational activities by objecting to the use of his dues for those purposes.
While the opt-in procedure may seem more likely to "actually" com-
municate Beck rights to employees, it is in direct opposition to the Su-
preme Court's decision in International Association of Machinists v.
Street."' Specifically, Street held that "dissent is not to be presumed-it
must affirmatively be made known to the union by the dissenting em-
ployee." '156 Thus, under Beck, the onus is on the agency fee payer to as-
sert an objection to nonrepresentational dues before he can receive a re-
duction."7 By following an opt-in procedure, such as that proposed by
Congress, an employee would be circumventing this objection require-
ment.'
While an opt-in procedure may be at odds with Supreme Court prece-
dent, the procedure does have some features that make it more attractive
151. See supra notes 91-101 and accompanying text (discussing the notice provisions in
both the Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, introduced by the House of Representatives, and
the Paycheck Protection Act, introduced by the Senate).
152. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 4(a)(1) (1997); see
also Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 9, 105th Cong. § 2 (1997).
153. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, The Worker Paycheck Fairness Act Before the House
Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 189 (1997) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R.
1625] (written statement of Marshall J. Breger, Visiting Professor, Columbus School of
Law, The Catholic University of America) (stating that the current opt-out procedures
create "confusion as to the clarity of the notice" and that opt-in procedures are fairer than
opt-out procedures).
154. See id.
155. 367 U.S. 740, 774 (1961). Although Street is a Railway Labor Act case, the Beck
Court found it to be controlling such that its dissent requirement would be applicable in
Beck. See Communications Workers of Am. v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 745 (1988); see also
supra note 43 (discussing the interaction of Street and the Railway Labor Act with Beck).
156. Street, 367 U.S. at 774. The Street Court went on to state that "[t]he union re-
ceiving money exacted from an employee under a union-shop agreement should not in
fairness be subjected to sanctions in favor of an employee who makes no complaint of the
use of his money for such activities." Id.
157. See Unions Lawyers Grapple With Beck Compliance; Right-to-Work Forces Map
Out Battle Plans, 131 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) A-1 (July 8, 1988).
158. See Street, 367 U.S. at 774.
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than the opt-out procedure. The opt-in procedure would distinguish be-
tween representational and nonrepresentational dues from the very start
of employment. 9
By distinguishing the two sets of dues, this opt-in procedure recognizes
the employee, rather than the union, as having control of the money
from the start.'60 The opt-in procedure also may be considered fairer to
the employee since he would not have to go through the refund proce-
dure to get his money.161
Furthermore, employees who must object under the opt-out procedure
sometimes find themselves harassed by the union.162 Prior written
159. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 157 (written statement of Roger Pi-
Ion, Ph.D., J.D., Senior Fellow and Director, Center for Constitutional Studies, CATO
Institute).
160. See id. (noting that this procedure would allow the employee to retain control and
be the "master" over the use of his dues).
161. See id. at 189 (written statement of Marshall J. Breger, Visiting Professor, Co-
lumbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America).
162. See Hearing on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 234 (statement of Charles W. Baird,
Ph.D., Professor of Economics and Director, Smith Center for Private Enterprise Studies);
see also Hearings on Mandatory Union Dues Before the Subcomm. on Employer-Employee
Relations of the House Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 105th Cong. 34-35 (1997)
[hereinafter Mandatory Union Dues] (statement of Jane Gansmann, TWA employee)
(stating that her name, along with the names of other union dues objectors, was printed in
a recent issue of the union's publication); Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 91 (tes-
timony of Charles Barth, Aircraft Maintenance Technician, U.S. Airways) (testifying that
letters were posted in the workplace "listing the names of Political Objectors, and labeling
them Union Objectors, Dues Objectors and Scabs"); Mandatory Union Dues, supra, at 18
(statement of Kerry W. Gipe, Aircraft Mechanic, U.S. Airways) (stating that, in addition
to the names of objectors being posted on both union and company property calling them
scabs, the objectors were told that their names also were being distributed to other union
officials so as to prevent them from being employed at any union shop in any other loca-
tion).
In addition to facing potential harassment for objecting to paying full dues, an employee
who becomes a nonmember of the union to receive the reduced dues may also lose his
right to participate in union affairs that affect him. See H.R. REP. No. 105-397, at 9
(1997). While a nonmember employee has a right to vote on collective bargaining repre-
sentatives (unions), a nonmember employee does not have a right to vote on the particular
individuals who represent the union. See Kidwell v. Transportation Communications Int'l
Union, 946 F.2d 283, 295 (4th Cir. 1991). Also, a nonmember employee is not permitted
to participate in the ratification of negotiated terms and conditions of employment. See id.
Furthermore, a nonmember employee has no right to vote in decisions about disputes,
such as whether or not to strike an employer. See id. at 296. Thus, in the process of be-
coming a nonmember of the union so as to take advantage of one's Beck rights, a non-
member employee also gives up significant workplace rights.
Section 7 of the Worker Paycheck Fairness Act sought to remedy nonmember employ-
ees' problems of harassment and loss of workplace rights. See H.R. REP. No. 105-397, at
19 (1997). Section 7 of the Act prohibited retaliation and coercion of a labor organization
against an employee exercising his Beck rights. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R.
1625, 105th Cong. § 7 (1997). Specifically, section 7 stated, "[i]t shall be unlawful for any
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authorizations would allow employees to exercise their Beck rights with-163
out such harassment. Finally, the opt-in notice procedure could reduce
the possibility of non-compliance with Beck principles,6 as well confu-
sion over the sufficiency of a union publication notice.1' Despite these
benefits, the NLRB refuses to prescribe a bright line form of notice'66 and
the opt-in procedure remains at odds with settled Supreme Court deci-
sions."'
The second proposed form of notice involves posting. This proposed
congressional requirement, like Executive Order 12,800, places the re-
sponsibility on the employer to post notice of Beck rights around the
workplace.1 69 Furthermore, the congressional proposal commands the
Department of Labor to prescribe the form and size of the notice. 7°
Likewise, Executive Order 12,800 also had commanded the Department
of Labor to prescribe the size and form of the notice. 71 However, the
labor organization to coerce, intimidate, threaten, interfere with, or retaliate against any
employee in the exercise of, or on account of having exercised, any right granted or pro-
tected by this Act." Id. Not only would section 7 of H.R. 1625 curb harassment, but "[it
would also prevent unions from forcing workers to resign their union membership-and in
the process, to give up critical workplace rights." See H.R. REP. No. 105-397, at 19 (1997).
Section 7, in effect, would overrule Kidwell. See id.
The language of section 7 of H.R. 1625 was modeled after the language in section 503 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act and section 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Section 503 of the Americans with Disabilities Act provides in part:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individ-
ual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised
or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other in-
dividual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this
chapter.
42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (1994).
163. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 234 (written statement of Charles W.
Baird).
164. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 195 (written statement of Marshall J.
Breger) (stating that prior written authorizations will reduce noncompliance with Beck
principles).
165. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 219 (written statement of Marshall J.
Breger) (stating that disclosure to employees of their Beck rights before a union collects
dues and fees not germane to collective bargaining will help reduce questions as to the suf-
ficiency of notice).
166. See supra note 120 and accompanying text (pointing out the NLRB's refusal in
Weyerhaeuser to prescribe the form that Beck notice must take).
167. See supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text (citing the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Street that an employee has an affirmative duty to object and that objection is not
to be presumed).
168. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997).
169. See id.; supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing Executive Order 12,800's
requirement that notice must be posted by the employer).
170. See H.R. 1625 § 5.
171. See Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992).
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one difference between Executive Order 12,800 and proposed congres-
sional notice-posting is that the Executive Order applies only to employ-
ees of federal contractors while the congressional posting would apply to
all employees covered by a union security clause.72 Despite this differ-
ence, it appears that the proposed congressional notice-requirements are
merely delayed support and implementation of President Bush's Execu-
tive Order.
7 1
One distinct point about proposed congressional notice requirements
can be seen in the punitive clauses that attach to unions for failure to
provide notice.7 Under the proposed Worker Paycheck Fairness Act,75
a union who failed to provide notice to employees would be liable to the
employee for up to two times the amount of dues and fees collected as
well as attorney's fees. 76 This severe liability doubles the liability cur-
rently imposed by the NLRB.' 77 However, both provisions may encoun-
ter the problem of an employee who would not have objected in prior
years even if he had been aware of Beck rights, but, now having the op-
portunity for financial gain, the employee may assert that he would have
objected in those prior years if notice had been provided. Further-
more, while congressional proposed notice requirements appear to be
Executive Order 12,800 reincarnated, the congressional requirements,
unlike the Executive Order, shift the liability to the union and away from
the employer. 9 This adjustment seems appropriate in light of the fact
172. Cf Ann Devroy, Bush Moves to Enforce Union Curb, WASH. POST, Apr. 14,
1992, at Al (stating that President Bush urged Congress to agree to implement Beck so
that all workers would be provided notice, but subsequently decided to issue the Executive
Order since doing so would not require congressional action).
173. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 218-19 (written statement of Mar-
shall J. Breger) (stating that the proposed congressional act requiring posting of notice
would "take the rescinded Bush Executive order requiring posting for federal contractors
and extend it to all employees subject to the NLRA").
174. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, § 4(c).
175. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (citing the House Bill and delineat-
ing its basic requirements).
176. See H.R. 1625, §§ 4(c)(1)-(3); supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
177. See supra note 90 and accompanying text (noting that the union may be liable to
reimburse the objecting employee for only the amount of dues and fees collected).
178. See Rochester Manufacturing Co., 323 N.L.R.B. No. 36, slip op. at 4, 154
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1249, 1253 (Mar. 12, 1997) (noting that the wrongdoer must bear the
burden of uncertainty and that the union has the opportunity to limit its liability by show-
ing that it provided notice in the past but that the employee failed to object).
179. See supra notes 174-76 and accompanying text (stating that, under H.R. 1625, the
union may be penalized when it fails to notify an employee of his Beck rights by having to
pay up to two times the amount of dues and fees that the employee would have objected
to had he been notified); cf supra note 47 and accompanying text (noting that Executive
Order 12,800 penalized the federal contractor employer for failing to notify employees of
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that it is the union, not the employer, who benefits from members' dues.
Thus, it is only proper that the benefiting union be penalized for failure
to provide notice as opposed to the employer, who reaps no direct finan-
cial benefit from employee dues. Finally, the stated rationale for the
congressional notice requirements is to make the playing field even and
fair between the individual employee and the union.' 8 President Bush,
in issuing Executive Order 12,800, and the NLRB similarly expressed this
rationale of fairness."s
III. PUSHING ASIDE THE WORKER: BECK NOTICE AS A PAWN IN A WAR
OF POLITICS
Despite assertions by Congress, the NLRB, and the President that no-
tifying employees of their Beck rights is about fairness, complying with
Beck's notice requirements has generated political controversy. 1 2 The
issue of enforcing Beck rights is not so much an individual rights issue
but, rather, more of a "political hot potato.' 83  Historically, labor has
been related directly to political involvement and protection' 84 Indeed,
much of labor's advances are due to participation in the political proc-
their Beck rights by taking away any government contracts as well as causing the contrac-
tor to be ineligible for future contracts).
180. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 51 (written statement of Rep. Harris
W. Fawell).
181. See Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights Concerning
Union Dues, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13,1992) (quoting "a principal of
fundamental fairness," expressed by Thomas Jefferson, upon signing Executive Order
12,800); supra note 122 and accompanying text (noting that the NLRB addressed this issue
of fairness in both California Saw and Weyerhaeuser).
In California Saw, the NLRB specifically used the term "fairness" in discussing employ-
ees' rights and a union's duty to notify the employees. See 320 N.L.R.B. 224, 233 n.50
(1995). The NLRB in Weyerhaeuser, on the other hand, refrained from using the word
"fairness," but revealed its concern about this issue by stating that "[t]hese notice re-
quirements furnish significant protection to the interests of the individual unit employee
vis-a-vis Beck rights, without compromising the countervailing collective interests of bar-
gaining unit employees in ensuring that every unit employee contributes to the cost of
collective-bargaining activities." 320 N.L.R.B. 349, 350 (1995).
182. See Mandatory Union Dues, supra note 162, at 59 (testimony of Allison Beck,
General Counsel, International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers).
183. See Robert L. Rose & Glenn Burkins, Unions Win Partial Victory in Case on
Dues, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 1996, at A3.
184. See Selected Statements From Hearing By House Subcommittee on Labor-
Management Relations on Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, 132 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) E-
14, E-20 (July 10, 1997) [hereinafter Selected Statements] (reprinting the testimony of
James B. Coppess on behalf of the Communications Workers of America). Mr. Coppess
cited Justice Felix Frankfurter's dissent in Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 814-15 (1961)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting), in which he stated, "[i]t is not true in life that political protec-
tion is irrelevant to, and insulated from, economic interests. It is not true for industry or
finance. Neither is it true for labor." Id.
[48:475
Requiring Unions to Notify Covered Employees
185
ess.
Unions are involved in politics in several ways:18 6 engaging in legislative
lobbying,' 87 endorsing individual candidates,' providing in-kind assis-
tance to candidates, and providing financial assistance through political
action committees (PACs)." Nearly all of the money raised by union• 1 9 1
PACs comes from its members. As a result, as union memberships are
on the decline, the labor movement's political power is similarly de-
creasing.'9
"[L]abor as a whole is closely tied to the Democratic Party." '193 In fact,
labor is a major weapon of the Democratic Party.' 94 As such a valued
part of this political arena, and because strikes and collective bargaining
are losing their effect, unions increasingly are seeking to advance their
causes through politics.9
Because unions are becoming more dependent on the political arena
and they rely on their members to support these political activities, it is
logical that unions need to maintain their membership base at all costs.'96
Thus, notifying covered employees that they can become nonmembers
and not support these political activities poses a real threat to unions."'
As a result, unions have no interest in notifying employees of their Beck
rights for fear that their political funds will decrease if employees object
185. See Selected Statements, supra note 184, at E-20 (testimony of James B. Coppess,
Communications Workers of America) (noting that labor has utilized the political process
to make such advances as "enactment of the minimum wage and forty-hour work-week,"
among others).
186. See John Thomas Delaney, The Future of Unions as Political Organizations, 12 J.
LAB. RES. 373, 373-74 (1991).
187. See id. at 374.
188. See id. at 373.
189. See id. at 374 (noting that examples of in-kind assistance include providing cam-
paign workers, telephone banks, equipment, and union mailing lists).
190. See id.
191. See John Thomas Delaney & Marick F. Masters, Union Characteristics and Union
Political Action, 42 LAB. L.J. 467,469 (1991).
192. See Berke, supra note 113, at E3.
193. See Delaney & Masters, supra note 191, at 468.
194. See Berke, supra note 113, at E3 (declaring that organized labor is the one major
weapon of Democrats with which Republicans could never compete).
195. See id.
196. See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text (noting that many of labor's ad-
vances are due to participation in the political process and that nearly all of the money
union PACs raise comes from its members).
197. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 5 (explaining that awareness of Beck rights could
cost unions millions of dollars in annual income otherwise used for political and other
nonrepresentational activities).
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to dues spent on nonrepresentational activities.198 In fact, Beck rights
have been and still are one of labor's best kept secrets.
Many employees are not aware of their rights under Beck to become a
reduced agency fee payer.2°' Critics claim that Beck rights have not
passed into the "common consciousness of industrial relations"' ' and4 .• 202
that the news media has not given this secret much publicity. However,
workers are waking up to the fact that their dues are being spent on po-
198. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 213 (written statement of Marshall J.
Breger) (noting that the Beck dues and fees reduction also reduces the discretionary funds
of unions).
199. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 6 (suggesting that this secret of modern day labor
relations is maintained by government inaction).
200. See supra note 102 (citing a poll of 1,000 union employees that found 78% of
them were not aware of their Beck rights). Other evidence that employees are not aware
of their Beck rights may be seen in recent cases before the NLRB where employees were
not given notice of these rights. See, e.g., Monson Trucking Inc., 324 N.L.R.B. No. 149,
156 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1277, 1280 (Oct. 31, 1997) (finding the union in violation of section
8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA for failing to provide an employee Beck rights notice); Service
Employees Int'l Union Local 74 (Parkside Lodge of Connecticut, Inc.), 323 N.L.R.B. No.
39, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1253, 1255 (Mar. 21, 1997) (same); Rochester Mfg. Co., 323
N.L.R.B. No. 36, 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1249, 1252 (Mar. 12, 1997) (same); International
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators (Hughes-
Avicom International, Inc.), 322 N.L.R.B. 1064, 1064 (1997) (reporting that an employee
directly asked a union representative whether there was a way he could pay only for col-
lective bargaining activities without joining the union but was told that a nonmember al-
ternative was not available).
While many employees may not be aware of their Beck rights, several individuals and
groups have attempted to educate and notify employees via the internet. See, e.g., Finan-
cial Core: Rights of Union Members (visited Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.campol.com/beck
.html> (advertising a handbook that informs people about their Beck rights); Right Now,
Labor Unions (visited Sept. 5, 1997) <http://www.rightnow.org/laborunions.html>; Un-
ions & Unions and Union Dues (visited Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.pff.org/heritage/labor/
workplace/uniondue.html> (citing Beck and the Senate's proposed Paycheck Protection
Act); Kenneth R. Weinstein & Thomas M. Wielgus, How Unions Deny Workers' Rights
(visited Sept. 22, 1997) <http://www.capitalresearch.org/heritage/library/categories/
regulation/bgl087.html> (providing information on Beck rights, stating that "[i]t is time to
make workers aware of their rights under applicable Supreme Court decisions and to
make it possible for them to exercise these rights freely").
201. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 213 (written statement of Marshall J.
Breger) (noting that there does not seem to be evidence that Beck rights are in the "com-
mon consciousness of industrial relations"). It also has been asserted that the "mere
finding" by the NLRB in unfair labor practice decisions about a union's duty to advise
employees of their Beck and General Motors rights will not guarantee that this issue will
come to the employees' attention. See id. at 206 (statement of Michael A. Taylor, former
Regional Director of the Oakland, California National Labor Relations Board Regional
Office).
202. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 6 (stating that the news media has not "widely
publicized the issue" of Beck rights notice).
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litical activities. 3
A. Each Attempt to Construct Beck Notice Requirements Has Been
Mixed With Political Motivations
President Bush's Executive Order 12,800 garnered wide attention from
both labor and management, despite the fact that the Order only applied
to federal contractors, an arguably limited group of people.2° In signing
the Order, President Bush proclaimed that it would prevent workers'
jobs and livelihoods from being threatened for refusing to make political
contributions. While President Bush never mentioned political motives
for issuing the Order,20 6 the Order could have cut off as much as $2.4 bil-
lion in union political money each year.2°7 Therefore, the order may have
been an attempt to lighten the political spending purse of organized la-
208bor or an attempt to gain conservative support during an election year.
While proclaiming a gain for individual rights, President Bush did state
that the order was part of a reform of politics in government.9 In an-
nouncing the Order, he noted that he was asking Congress to reform
campaign financing and fighting to eliminate special interest PACs.21 °
President Bush's goal to eliminate PACs would have severely hurt un-
ions211 because unions cannot spend money directly on candidates but
203. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 112 (written statement of Steven J.
Nemirow, Esq.).
204. See MCCALLION, supra note 111, at CRS-13 (noting as well that federal contrac-
tors in right-to-work states could be exempted from Executive Order 12,800 "where no
union was formally recognized or certified").
205. See Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights Concerning
Union Dues, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 644 (Apr. 13, 1992).
206. See Berke, supra note 113, at E3 (reporting that President Bush claimed that his
motive for issuing Executive Order 12,800 was to "'guarantee that no American will have
his job or livelihood threatened for refusing to contribute to political activities against his
will,"' but he did not mention political motives).
207. See id. (noting the White House estimates of the Executive Order's effect).
208. See id. Either way, however, the Order may be seen as using Beck rights notice as
a political tool; AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland stated that the Order was an "11th-
hour election year bid" to gain conservative support. See Clinton Rescinds Executive Or-
ders on Beck Disclosure, 'Open Bidding,' 7 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 125, 126 (Feb. 3, 1993);
see also Devroy, supra note 172, at Al (stating that the Order was a bow to GOP conser-
vatives and was used merely as an election year weapon because President Bush avoided
such an order for his first three years as President).
209. See Remarks on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights Concerning
Union Dues, 28 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 644, 645 (Apr. 13, 1992).
210. See id. President Bush asserted that he did not just want to restrict PACs, but
wanted to eliminate them altogether. See id.
211. See generally Obligations of Federal Contractors and Subcontractors; Employee
Rights Concerning Payment of Union Dues or Fees, 57 Fed. Reg. 49,588, 49,589 (1992)
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must rely on PACs.2 ' / • • 1. 211
The NLRB also has been less than neutral in its decision making. In
fact, the California Saw Board has been labeled a "Clinton-appointed
NLRB" that bowed to labor in an election year.1 Furthermore, a ma-
jority of the California Saw Board has been identified as siding more
closely with unions than management."' Many also contend that the
Board, lacking neutral enforcement, has been attempting to hollow out
the Beck decision through "interpretive gymnastics." '216 An example of
this may be found in a complaint issued against an employer, alleging
that an unfair labor practice occurred, when the employer sent a letter to
his employees notifying them of their Beck rights."' As a result, employ-
ers, fearing sanctions from a union-sided NLRB, may refrain from taking
it upon themselves to notify employees of their Beck rights."'
In Congress, H.R. 1625, the Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, was spon-
(stating that the rules proposed by the Department of Labor to implement Executive Or-
der 12,800 were "purely politically motivated").
212. See Delaney, supra note 186, at 376 (noting that unions are not allowed to directly
spend their members' dues money on political candidates but may do so indirectly through
PACs).
213. See Hearings on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 157 n.4 (written statement of Roger
Pilon) (citing, as an example of the Board's lack of neutrality, a complaint filed by the
NLRB's general counsel against an employer for notifying his employees by letter of their
Beck rights).
214. See Rose & Burkins, supra note 183, at A3 (quoting a statement of the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation that the NLRB "genuflected to Big Labor in an
election year"). Of the four members deciding California Saw, the three concurring mem-
bers, Chairman Gould, Member Browning, and Member Truesdale, were all Democrats,
while the lone dissenter, Member Cohen, was a Republican. See id. Tim McConville, a
National Right-To-Work Committee spokesman has said that "it is not surprising that an
agency made up of Clinton appointees would not see fit to impose 'a single meaningful
restraint on union officials' use of forced dues for politics."' See NLRA's Fair Representa-
tion Principles Govern Beck Dues Challenges, NLRB Says, 10 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 89
(Jan. 31, 1996).
215. See Edward B. Miller, What Has The Gould Board Been Doing?, 47 LAB. L.J. 75,
75 (1996) (noting also that NLRB General Counsel Fred Feinstein was a long-time Demo-
crat and a union sympathizer).
216. See Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 234 (written statement of Charles
Baird) (speculating additionally that the Department of Labor would rather ignore Beck
than enforce it).
217. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 157 n.4 (written statement of Roger
Pilon) (citing NLRB v. Beverly Health and Rehabilitation Servs., Case # 6-CA27453, ar-
gued before an Administrative Law Judge on June 25, 1997).
218. See Campaign Finance Revisions, supra note 124, at 4-5 (written statement of
Robert J. LaJeunesse) (stating that "[t]he rare employer that tries to set the record
straight, and tell employees that they have the right to refrain from union membership, is
subject to sanctions or worse").
[48:475
Requiring Unions to Notify Covered Employees
sored by Representative Fawell2"9 and cosponsored by 111 members, all
of whom were Republicans. In an attack against Democratic opposi-
tion, Representative Fawell stated that the onus should not be on the
employee to object to nonrepresentational dues spending and that "if his
subcommittee [does] not reach some sort of compromise, then it [is] very
likely that labor 'is going to lose the union security clause all together
[sic]' and that the 'right-to-work' community will prevail in all 50
states."
2 2
The Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, while purporting to protect the
rights of individual workers, has been criticized as an effort to quash un-
ion voices in political activities such as elections.2  Thus, the House Bill
may be considered an exploit of antiunion sentiment just as President
Clinton asserted Bush's Executive Order 12,800 was distinctly anti-
223
union.
Democratic opposition to legislation such as the Worker Paycheck
Fairness Act also may have motives aside from the purported protection
of individual rights. "Politicians who are generously supported by union
political cash and in-kind contributions are afraid that unions might have
significantly fewer donations to make" if such acts are made law. 24 The
trade union movement has endorsed every Democratic Party candidate
219. See Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, H.R. 1625, (visited Oct. 25,
1998) <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HRO1625:P/bss/dlO5query.htmll>.
220. See Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress, H.R. 1625, supra note 219.
These cosponsors include such Representatives as former Rep. Gingrich and Rep. Armey.
See id. In fact, H.R. 1625 is supported by the entire Republican House leadership. See
H.R. REP. No. 105-397, at 3 (1997).
221. Fawell Wants Bipartisan Input in Crafting 'Beck' Bill; Warns Labor Could Lose
Big, 11 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 278 (Mar. 19, 1997).
222. See Hearing on H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 128 (written statement of Mitchell
Kraus, General Counsel, Transportation Communications International Union) (stating
that the Act "is an effort to punish union members for making their views heard on issues
during the 1996 election"); see also William B. Gould IV, "Campaign Finance Reform and
the Union Dues Dispute Under Beck", Speech at the Iowa Chapter of the Industrial Rela-
tions Research Association Fall Meeting at 2 (Oct. 8, 1997) (NLRB Press Release R-
2259), available at <http://www.nlrb.gov/r2259.html> (stating that "[m]embers of Congress,
on the Republican side of the aisle, are angry about the support given by the AFL-CIO to
the Democratic Party candidates in '96, and the attacks made upon Republican members
of the 104th Congress through television issue advertisements" (footnote omitted)).
223. See Statement on Revocation of Certain Executive Orders Concerning Federal
Contracting, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 119, 120 (Feb. 1, 1993) (making these com-
ments in conjunction with revoking Bush's Executive Order 12,800); see generally Gould,
supra note 222, at 4 (stating that the general requirements of a union to notify members of
their right to become nonmembers promotes anti-unionism in the workplace).
224. Hearings on H.R. 3580, supra note 14, at 235 (written statement of Charles W.
Baird).
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for President, save one, since 1952.2 President Clinton, as one of those
Democratic Party candidates supported by the trade union movement,
has been criticized as keeping employees in the dark about their Beck
rights.226
B. Posting as an Equitable Resolve
"Actual" communication of Beck rights may only be realized where
employees are orally told of their rights or are required to read and sign
225. See Gould, supra note 222, at 2 (commenting on use of union dues for political
activities, campaign finance reform, and the proposed Worker Paycheck Fairness Act).
The one Democratic Party candidate that the trade union movement did not endorse was
George McGovern in 1972. See id.
226. See 143 CONG. REC. S264 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Senator Nickles)
(introducing the Paycheck Protection Act, S. 9, which would require unions to obtain prior
written authorizations from employees before collecting or assessing dues from employees
that would be spent on political activities). Senator Nickles made this comment while
noting that one of President Clinton's first acts in office was to repeal the regulations im-
plementing Bush's Executive Order 12,800. See id. Also, it has been suggested that Presi-
dent Clinton will veto the Paycheck Protection Act if it passes Congress. See Hearing on
H.R. 1625, supra note 153, at 190 (written statement of Marshall J. Breger) (noting that
Vice President Gore made this assertion to the AFL-CIO Executive Council).
This interaction between political spending and notifying employees of their Beck rights
has surfaced as a part of campaign finance reform legislation. See supra note 91 (citing
H.R. 3580, the Worker Right to Know Act from the 104th Congress). The Worker Right
to Know Act is nearly identical to the 105th Congress's Worker Paycheck Fairness Act,
H.R. 1625. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text. Both Acts require unions to
obtain prior written consent from employees before collecting dues for nonrepresenta-
tional activities as well as notice posting of employees' Beck rights. See id. The Worker
Right to Know Act was eventually incorporated into the 104th Congress's Campaign Fi-
nance Reform Act of 1996, H.R. 3820. See supra note 91. The 105th Congress likewise
took steps to require unions to notify employees of their Beck rights as part of its cam-
paign finance reform legislation. See Helen Dewar, Senate to Debate Campaign Funds Bill
this Session, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997, at Al (citing highlights of the McCain-Feingold
campaign finance reform legislation). The proposed campaign finance reform legislation
would have "[required] labor unions to tell nonmembers they [could] get refunds on fees
used for political purposes." Id.
While the 104th and 105th Congresses' efforts are modern attempts to implement Beck
notice into campaign finance reform legislation, they are by no means the first. President
Bush proposed legislation to implement the Beck decision as part of campaign finance re-
form legislation as far back as 1989, the year after the Supreme Court issued Beck. See
MCCALLION, supra note 111, at CRS-20 (noting that the White House asserted this
proposition). In fact, President Bush, in his remarks on signing Executive Order 12,800
requiring federal contractors to notify employees of their Beck rights, stated that he was
"asking Congress to enact a sweeping reform of campaign financ[e]" legislation. Remarks
on Signing the Executive Order on Employee Rights Concerning Union Dues, 28
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 644, 645 (Apr. 13, 1992). Thus, the issue of Beck rights no-
tice has been recognized as a part of campaign finance legislation since the Supreme Court
issued the Beck decision.
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227
a notice authorizing unions to use their dues for political purposes.
Yet, this type of opt-in method is not supported by case law.2
Unions, while opposing stricter notification requirements that may ex-
tract money from their coffers, cannot delay disclosure forever and delay
may only discredit them. 9 Unions may feel a loss of money and mem-
bers in the short run if more Beck rights notice is provided.23" However,
if notice is not given, unions run the risk of alienating its members as
they realize that they have been kept in the dark about their rights.2 '
Thus, it may be in the unions' best interest to make more of an effort to
232
notify their employees.
The one method that has been accepted by the Executive Office, the
NLRB, and Congress is to post notices at the worksite.2 33 Such notice-
posting would be accessible to all employees and would make them more
aware of their Beck rights.23 However, such notice may also need to be
provided in other languages in order to accommodate those non-English
speaking employees2 5 Despite the apparent benefits of notice-posting, it
has been criticized as not providing employees with information about
227. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (stating that communication will be
"actual" only where the person sought to be informed knows of the fact in question).
228. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774 (1961) (stating
that an employee has an affirmative duty to opt-out before receiving a reduction in dues
and fees).
229. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 5 (maintaining that beyond losing credibility,
avoiding disclosure of Beck rights "will invite intervention by the courts, legislatures, or
other government bodies").
230. See id. at 23.
231. See id.
232. See generally supra notes 229-31 and accompanying text (noting that unions may
lose some of their membership if they delay providing notice).
233. See Worker Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1625, 105th Cong. § 5 (1997) (not en-
acted) (requiring employers to post notices in plants and offices); Exec. Order No. 12,800,
57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992) (requiring federal contractors to post Beck notice at the work-
site); MCCALLION ET AL., supra note 111, at CRS-19 (asserting that the NLRB may re-
quire posting of notice as a part of a cease and desist order).
234. See MCCALLION ET AL., supra note 111, at CRS-13 (pointing out that notice
posting specifically would make more employees aware of their Beck rights).
235. See generally Service Employees Int'l Union Local 254, 324 N.L.R.B. No. 126, slip
op. at 1 n.3 (Oct. 15, 1997), available at Decisions and Orders of the NLRB (Volume 324)
(visited Oct. 25, 1998) <http://www.nlrb.gov/slip324.html> (requiring the union to post a
Spanish translation of the order issued by the Board). This case involved picketing and
handbilling of a hospital in Rhode Island. See id. slip op. at 1. The NLRB found that this
picketing had an unlawful secondary objective such that it violated section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B)
of the National Labor Relations Act. See id. While this case did not involve a union's
duty to provide Beck notice to its employees as part of its duty of fair representation under
section 8(b)(1)(A), it does illustrate the potential need to accommodate non-English
speaking employees by posting required notices in languages other than English.
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their other NLRA rights.236 This could be resolved by attaching a toll-
free phone number to the notice that employees could call to find out
about their other rights.37 Unions could fulfill their duty of fair represen-
tation and avoid being criticized of attempting to hide Beck rights from
its members by taking such a proactive approach.2 ' Thus, dispute over
the proper method for providing employees notice may be put to rest by
meeting in the middle at a notice-posting requirement.
Notice posting may be sufficient to notify employees of their Beck
rights, but whether unions will voluntarily provide this notice remains to
be seen. Perhaps the only way that notice posting or other increased no-
tification procedures may be required is if the Supreme Court addresses
this issue in light of its failure to address notice requirements in the Beck
decision.23 9 Thus, the ultimate decision about what constitutes sufficient
notice to actually communicate Beck rights to employees may rest with
the Supreme Court.24
IV. CONCLUSION
Labor unions will not provide more notice for fear of losing members
and the accompanying dues.24' Employers will not provide employees
236. See MCCALLION ET AL., supra note 111, at CRS-14 (indicating a commentator's
criticism of President Bush's Executive Order 12,800 for only notifying employees of their
Beck rights and not of their numerous other NLRA rights).
237. See generally Right-To-Work Group Unveils Toll-Free Number Regarding Rebate
of Union Dues, 10 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 867-68 (Sept. 4, 1996) (noting that such a phone
number already has been set up by' the National Right to Work Legal Defense Founda-
tion). The number, 1-888-789-4255, is toll-free. See id. Additionally, the sample notice
provided in President Bush's Executive Order 12,800 listed the address of the National
Labor Relations Board so that employees could inquire further about their rights. See
Exec. Order No. 12,800, 57 Fed. Reg. 12,985 (1992).
238. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (stating that unions may risk alienating
members as the members begin to realize that they have been kept in the dark about their
Beck rights).
239. See California Saw & Knife Works, 320 N.L.R.B 224, 225 (1995) (noting that the
issue of whether a union must provide a nonmember employee notice of his right to object
to payment of full dues and fees is an issue that came out of Beck yet was not addressed by
the Supreme Court).
240. But see Right-To-Work Group, Machinists Union File Competing Appeals on
Dues Issue, 10 Lab. Rel. Wk. (BNA) 113, 114 (Feb. 7, 1996) (quoting International Asso-
ciation of Machinists attorney Mark Schneider as saying that "[a]s for a possible return to
the Supreme Court ... in light of the developing body of case law resolving these [Beck]
issues [such as notice requirements], the justices may not want to revisit the Beck ques-
tion").
241. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 6 (stating that "long-standing divisions among po-
litical parties" prevent politicians from reaching an agreement on the way in which unions
must notify employees of their Beck rights).
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with Beck rights notice for fear of reprisal. 42 Politicians are unable to
reach an agreement on notice requirements because of the divisive na-
ture of labor.24 '3 The NLRB and judiciary have been slow in responding
to Beck notice requirements.' Further conflict about the implications of
California Saw will persist.2 45 Also, the California Saw decision is being
appealed with regard to the portion that places an affirmative duty on
unions to notify all covered employees of their Beck rights.246 Thus, in
order to prevent Congress from contravening the precedent in Street,
247
and to enforce the holding in Beck, the Supreme Court may have to ad-
dress this issue of proper Beck notice as it works its way through the
courts.
242. See supra notes 217-18 and accompanying text (citing a complaint issued against
an employer who sent a letter to his employees notifying them of their Beck rights and
noting that this type of sanction may prevent employers from providing their employees
with Beck rights notice).
243. See Hunter, supra note 117, at 6.
244. See id.
245. See Rose, supra note 183, at A3 (stating that the California Saw decision "will be
used as a guidepost in future cases" as conflict about its implications persist).
246. See Right-To-Work Group, supra note 240, at 113 (noting that both the National
Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation and the International Association of Machinists
have filed appeals). An attorney for the International Association of Machinists stated
that "the union will challenge that portion of the Board's decision that creates an affirma-
tive obligation on the part of the union to notify all in the bargaining unit concerning their
rights under the U.S. Supreme Court's 1988 holding of Communications Workers v. Beck."
See id. (citation omitted).
247. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 774 (1961) (holding
that an employee's dissent is not to be presumed; rather, the employee must affirmatively
object before dues can be reduced).
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